Codification schemes and finite automata

被引：0

作者：

Hernandez, Penelope ^{[1
]}

Urbano, Amparo

机构：

[1] Univ Valencia, Dept Anal Econ, Valencia 46022, Spain

来源：

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 2008年 / 56卷 / 03期

关键词：

Complexity; Codification; Repeated games; Finite automata;

D O I：

10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.01.007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper is a note on how Information Theory and Codification Theory are helpful in the computational design of both communication protocols and strategy sets in the framework of finitely repeated games played by bounded rational agents. More precisely, we show the usefulness of both theories to improve the existing automata bounds on the work of Neyman (1998) Finitely repeated games with finite automata, Mathematics of Operations Research, 23 (3), 513-552. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：395 / 409

页数：15

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