To Europe via the Balkans - Germany and France and the wars in the former Yugoslavia

Starting from very different positions on the outbreak of violence in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, French and German policies slowly converged over time and even reached a similar position on the Kosovo crisis. Yet, both foreign policies did not concentrate on the conflict solution as such but were rather concerned with preventing any negative spill-over on the European integration process and Franco-German relations respectively. The first part of the article summarises the two foreign policies in three phases of the Yugoslavian drama: First, the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, second, the Bosnian war and third, the Kosovo crisis in 1998-99. By means of two heuristic criterea (behaviour towards institutions and conflict perception), both foreign policies are then compared analytically. Moreover, the striking differences in policies towards institutions and conflict perceptions motivate the generation of hypotheses in the next part. For France, we hold that identity theory might present a good approach in order to understand why French foreign policy was primarily driven by self-perceptions. Germany, by contrast, seems to be better suited to the application of role theory with its strong emphasis on alter-expectations. The article concludes by focusing on the perspectives of European integration and the Franco-German relations.