Leniency Programs and the Design of Antitrust: Experimental Evidence with Free-Form Communication

被引:16
作者
Dijkstra, Peter T. [1 ]
Haan, Marco A. [2 ]
Schoonbeek, Lambert [2 ]
机构
[1] Netherlands Author Consumers & Markets ACM, POB 16326, NL-2500 BH The Hague, Netherlands
[2] Univ Groningen, Dept Econ Econometr & Finance, POB 800, NL-9700 AV Groningen, Netherlands
关键词
Antitrust; Cartels; Experiment; Leniency program; PRICE ANNOUNCEMENTS; CARTEL FORMATION; COLLUSION; CONSPIRACIES; INFORMATION; AGREEMENT; RESTRAINT; POLICIES;
D O I
10.1007/s11151-020-09789-5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We present experimental evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs. Different from other leniency experiments, ours allows subjects to have free-form communication. We do not find much of an effect of leniency programs. Leniency does not deter cartels. It only delays them. Free-form communication allows subjects to build trust and resolve conflicts. Reporting and defection rates are low, especially when compared to experiments with restricted communication. Indeed, communication is so effective that, with leniency in place, prices are not affected if cartels are fined and cease to exist.
引用
收藏
页码:13 / 36
页数:24
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