Reasons as explanations

Can a normative reason be understood as a kind of explanation? I here consider and argue against two important analyses of reasons as explanations. John Broome argues that we can analyze reasons in terms of the concepts of explanation and ought. On his view, reasons to I center dot are either facts that explain why one ought to I center dot (what he calls "perfect reasons") or facts that play a for-I center dot role in weighing explanations (what he calls "pro tanto reasons"). I argue against Broome's account of both perfect and pro tanto reasons. Other philosophers, including Joseph Raz, analyze reasons in terms of the concepts of explanation and good. On this view, some fact is a reason to I center dot if and only if that fact explains why I center dot-ing would be good in some respect, to some degree. This view avoids the objections to Broome's view, but should be rejected since not all explanations of why I center dot-ing would be good constitute reasons to phi.