Debunking Biased Thinkers (Including Ourselves)

被引：24

作者：

Ballantyne, Nathan ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Fordham Univ, Bronx, NY 10458 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION | 2015年 / 1卷 / 01期

关键词：

epistemology; social epistemology; skepticism; sources of knowledge and justification; philosophy of psychology; BLIND SPOT; DISAGREEMENT; PERSPECTIVE;

D O I：

10.1017/apa.2014.17

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Most of what we believe comes to us from the word of others, but we do not always believe what we are told. We often reject thinkers' reports by attributing biases to them. We may call this debunking. In this essay, I consider how debunking might work and then examine whether, and how often, it can help to preserve rational belief in the face of disagreement.

引用

页码：141 / 162

页数：22

共 46 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 2009, METAPHYSICS

[2]

Arnauld Antoine., 1996, Logic or the Art of Thinking, V5th

[3] THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNPOSSESSED EVIDENCE [J].