The existence of a unique core partition in coalition formation games

被引：3
作者：
Inal, Hakan [1 ]
机构：
[1] Volvo Grp, Gothenburg, Sweden
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2019年 / 114卷
关键词：
Coalition formation; Core; Stability; Matching; Algorithm; STABILITY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.009
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In coalition formation games with arbitrary collection of permissible coalitions, a top/stable-coalition condition is sufficient for the existence of a unique core partition, strengthening uniqueness results both in Pycia (2012) and in Banerjee et al. (2001). (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：215 / 231
页数：17
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