Money and Politics: The Effects of Campaign Spending Limits on Political Entry and Competition

被引：14

作者：

Avis, Eric ^{[1
]}

Ferraz, Claudio ^{[2
,3
,4
,5
,6
]}

Finan, Frederico ^{[5
,6
,7
,8
]}

Varjao, Carlos ^{[9
]}

机构：

[1] HEC Montreal, Dept Appl Econ, Montreal, PQ, Canada

[2] Univ British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

[3] Pontificia Univ Catolica Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

[4] Vancouver Sch Econ, Vancouver, BC, Canada

[5] BREAD, Berkeley, CA USA

[6] NBER, Cambridge, MA USA

[7] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Econ, Berkeley, CA USA

[8] IZA, Berkeley, CA USA

[9] Amazon, Seattle, WA USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS | 2022年 / 14卷 / 04期

关键词：

ELECTION OUTCOMES; FINANCE; POLICY; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1257/app.20200296

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper studies the effects of campaign spending limits on the political entry, selection, and behavior of local politicians in Brazil. We analyze a reform that limits campaign spending for mayoral elections. The limits were implemented with a discontinuity that we exploit for causal identification. We find that stricter limits reduce reelection rates and increase political competition by attracting more candidates who are also less wealthy and rely less on self-financing. Despite their effects on electoral outcomes, stricter limits did not lead to significant short-run improvements in policy outcomes, such as in education and health. (JEL D72, O17)

引用

页码：167 / +

页数：34

共 54 条

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