FALLIBILISM, EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITY, AND EPISTEMIC AGENCY

被引：21

作者：

Reed, Baron ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

来源：

关键词：

KNOWLEDGE;

D O I：

10.1111/phis.12003

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：40 / 69

页数：30

共 35 条

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