The effects of discretionary federal spending on parliamentary election results

被引:7
作者
Evans, TA [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Dept Econ, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1093/ei/cbj010
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Parliamentary rules make it difficult for opposition members of Parliament to influence government spending. As the electorate is aware of this situation discretionary federal spending is expected to affect vote-share differently for majority and opposition incumbents. Consistent estimators yield positive and significant point estimates for the impact of increases in spending for majority incumbents in Canadian federal elections yet yield negative but insignificant point estimates for opposition incumbents. Furthermore, $100 additional federal spending per capita in an electoral district is estimated to increase majority candidates' vote-share, regardless of incumbency, by between 1.5 and 2.5 percentage points.
引用
收藏
页码:234 / 248
页数:15
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