A Note on Stackelberg Games

被引:23
作者
Nie, Pu-yan [1 ]
Zhang, Pei-ai [2 ]
机构
[1] Jinan Univ, Inst Ind Econ, Guangzhou 510632, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[2] Jinan Univ, Dept Math, Guangzhou 510632, Guangdong, Peoples R China
来源
2008 CHINESE CONTROL AND DECISION CONFERENCE, VOLS 1-11 | 2008年
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Stackelberg game; payoff function; game theory;
D O I
10.1109/CCDC.2008.4597505
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Nash game and Stackelberg one are two basic games in game theory community. It is extremely important to further investigate them. Here we show that the leaders will benefit from the interactions in a game. The organization structure in economics is considered with game theory techniques. By game theory approaches, the Nash games and Stackelberg game (leader-follower games) are compared. In a Stackelberg game, if the leader acts as an average player in a Nash game, his/her payoff function value will be reduced. We therefore conclude that a player in a Nash game will benefit from the interactions if he/she transfers into the leader in the corresponding Stackelberg game and other players act as the followers.
引用
收藏
页码:1201 / 1203
页数:3
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