On the efficiency of indirect taxes in differentiated oligopolies with asymmetric costs

被引：32
|
作者：
Wang, X. Henry [1 ,2 ]
Zhao, Jingang [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211 USA
[2] Univ Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2009年 / 96卷 / 03期
关键词：
Unit tax; Ad valorem tax; Cournot competition; Bertrand competition; AD-VALOREM TAXATION; UNIT TAXES; MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION; IMPERFECT COMPETITION; EQUILIBRIUM; MODEL;
D O I：
10.1007/s00712-008-0046-7
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper shows that unit taxation can be welfare superior to ad valorem taxation in asymmetric and differentiated oligopolies if the goods are sufficiently differentiated, the cost variance is sufficiently large and the ad valorem tax rate is sufficiently high. Moreover, this result holds under either Cournot competition or Bertrand competition.
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页码：223 / 239
页数：17
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