Insurer risk and performance before, during, and after the 2008 financial crisis: The role of monitoring institutional ownership

被引:7
作者
Ma, Yu-Luen [1 ]
Ren, Yayuan [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ North Texas, Dept Finance Insurance Real Estate & Law, Denton, TX 76203 USA
[2] Illinois State Univ, Dept Finance Insurance & Law, Campus Box 5480, Normal, IL 61761 USA
关键词
financial crisis; financial performance; institutional ownership; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; PROPERTY-LIABILITY; LIFE-HEALTH; ORGANIZATIONAL-STRUCTURE; INSURANCE INDUSTRY; STOCK RETURNS; CROSS-SECTION; ASSET RISK; PANEL-DATA;
D O I
10.1111/jori.12323
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study examines the relationship between institutional ownership and insurers' risk and performance before, during, and after the 2008 financial crisis. Monitoring institutional investors are defined as those that have (a) a long-term investment horizon, (b) large holdings in the investee firm, (c) independence from management, and (d) a large portion of their portfolio invested in the firm. We measure both the level and persistence of monitoring institutional ownership and find a negative relationship between monitoring institutional ownership and an insurer's stock stability and performance during the crisis. Further examination reveals that these firms took more risk before the crisis. Whereas many monitoring institutions exited the insurance market after the crisis, evidence suggests that the remaining institutional investors in the postcrisis period have a longer investment horizon and are active in monitoring and risk management.
引用
收藏
页码:351 / 380
页数:30
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