Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works

被引:92
作者
Gans-Morse, Jordan [1 ]
Borges, Mariana [1 ]
Makarin, Alexey [2 ]
Mannah-Blankson, Theresa [3 ]
Nickow, Andre [4 ]
Zhang, Dong [5 ]
机构
[1] Northwestern Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Scott Hall,601 Univ Pl, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[2] Northwestern Univ, Dept Econ, 2211 Campus Dr,3464, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[3] Messiah Coll, Dept Business, 654 Allenview Dr, Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 USA
[4] Northwestern Univ, Dept Sociol, 1810 Chicago Ave, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[5] Lingnan Univ, Dept Polit Sci, 8 Castle Peak Rd,Dorothy YL Wong Bldg Rm 221, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
Anti-corruption; Bureaucracy; Corruption; Civil service; Interdisciplinary; PUBLIC-SERVICE DELIVERY; ANTI-CORRUPTION; FOREIGN-AID; DEVELOPMENTAL STATE; FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION; EVERYDAY CORRUPTION; FIGHTING CORRUPTION; FIELD EXPERIMENT; CROSS-COUNTRY; PAY BRIBES;
D O I
10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.12.015
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
This article offers the first comprehensive review of the interdisciplinary state of knowledge regarding anti-corruption policies, with a particular focus on reducing corruption among civil servants. Drawing on the work of economists, political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists, we examine seven policy categories: (1) rewards and penalties; (2) monitoring; (3) restructuring bureaucracies; (4) screening and recruiting; (5) anti-corruption agencies; (6) educational campaigns; and (7) international agreements. Notably, rigorous empirical evaluation is lacking for the majority of commonly prescribed anticorruption policies. Nevertheless, we find growing evidence of the effectiveness of policies based on monitoring, including anti-corruption audits and e-governance. In addition, adequate civil service wages seem to be a necessary but insufficient condition for control of corruption. An emerging skepticism regarding the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies also is apparent in the literature. We conclude with broader lessons drawn from our review, such as the recognition that when corruption is a systemic problem, it cannot be treated in the long term with individual-level solutions. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:171 / 188
页数:18
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