The ontology of the Categories relies on several fundamental relations that obtain between beings. One of these is the relation of being-said-of. The most widespread view among commentators is that the relation of being-said-of amounts to essential predication. However, some relatively neglected textual evidence tells against such an interpretation and points towards a different account of the relation of being-said-of. On this alternative picture, while the relation of being-said-of is essential predication when it obtains between universals, it coincides with mere predication when it obtains between a universal and an individual. The relation of being said -of turns out to be closely linked with paronymy: in most cases where a property (e.g. generosity) is in an individual, a paronymous universal (e.g. generous) is said of that individual. However, the alternative picture also faces difficulties. In conclusion, it remains unclear what position, if any, can be coherently attributed to Aristotle.
