Vacuous Information Affects Bargaining

被引：0
作者：
Korth, Christian [1 ]
Reiss, J. Philipp [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Bayreuth, Dept Econ VWL 4, D-95440 Bayreuth, Germany
[2] KIT, Inst Econ, D-76131 Karlsruhe, Germany
来源：
GROUP DECISION AND NEGOTIATION | 2014年 / 23卷 / 04期
关键词：
Ultimatum game; Vacuous information; Experiment; Bargaining; Self-serving bias; Anchoring; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; LOSS AVERSION; ULTIMATUM; FAIRNESS; BEHAVIOR; GAME; ANONYMITY; POWER; NAME;
D O I：
10.1007/s10726-013-9361-7
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号：
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
We introduce vacuous information into buyer-seller ultimatum exchanges and provide evidence that it can affect bargaining outcomes. Notably bargaining behavior is affected asymmetrically in a way that leads allocative efficiency to respond negatively. Our results are consistent with self-serving bias that commands players to interpret vacuous information in a self-serving way.
引用
收藏
页码：921 / 936
页数：16
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] Equity dynamics in bargaining without information exchange
    Heinrich H. Nax
    Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2015, 25 : 1011 - 1026
  • [42] Bargaining over a Common Good with Private Information
    Lindahl, Therese
    Johannesson, Magnus
    SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2009, 111 (03) : 547 - 565
  • [43] Enhancing Honesty in Bargaining Under Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study of the Bonus Procedure
    James E. Parco
    Amnon Rapoport
    Group Decision and Negotiation, 2004, 13 : 539 - 562
  • [44] Power and deception in ultimatum bargaining
    Koning, Lukas
    Steinel, Wolfgang
    van Beest, Ilja
    van Dijk, Eric
    ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES, 2011, 115 (01) : 35 - 42
  • [45] Two-person bargaining with verifiable information
    de Clippel, G
    Minelli, E
    JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 2004, 40 (07) : 799 - 813
  • [46] Hidden information, bargaining power, and efficiency: an experiment
    Antonio Cabrales
    Gary Charness
    Marie Claire Villeval
    Experimental Economics, 2011, 14 : 133 - 159
  • [47] On perceptions of fairness: The role of valuations, outside options, and information in ultimatum bargaining games
    Schmitt, PM
    EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 2004, 7 (01) : 49 - 73
  • [48] Hidden information, bargaining power, and efficiency: an experiment
    Cabrales, Antonio
    Charness, Gary
    Villeval, Marie Claire
    EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 2011, 14 (02) : 133 - 159
  • [49] Mediation:: incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication
    Jarque, X
    Ponsatí, C
    Sákovics, J
    JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 2003, 39 (07) : 803 - 830
  • [50] Social motives in bilateral bargaining games: How power changes perceptions of fairness
    Mallucci, Paola
    Wu, Diana Yan
    Cui, Tony Haitao
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2019, 166 : 138 - 152
12345