Vacuous Information Affects Bargaining

被引：0
|
作者：
Korth, Christian [1 ]
Reiss, J. Philipp [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Bayreuth, Dept Econ VWL 4, D-95440 Bayreuth, Germany
[2] KIT, Inst Econ, D-76131 Karlsruhe, Germany
来源：
GROUP DECISION AND NEGOTIATION | 2014年 / 23卷 / 04期
关键词：
Ultimatum game; Vacuous information; Experiment; Bargaining; Self-serving bias; Anchoring; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; LOSS AVERSION; ULTIMATUM; FAIRNESS; BEHAVIOR; GAME; ANONYMITY; POWER; NAME;
D O I：
10.1007/s10726-013-9361-7
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号：
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
We introduce vacuous information into buyer-seller ultimatum exchanges and provide evidence that it can affect bargaining outcomes. Notably bargaining behavior is affected asymmetrically in a way that leads allocative efficiency to respond negatively. Our results are consistent with self-serving bias that commands players to interpret vacuous information in a self-serving way.
引用
收藏
页码：921 / 936
页数：16
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