Yardstick competition, fiscal disparities, and equalization

被引:26
作者
Allers, Maarten A. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Groningen, Ctr Res Local Govt Econ COELO, NL-9700 AV Groningen, Netherlands
关键词
Yardstick competition; Fiscal disparities; Equalization;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.076
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The theory of political yardstick competition states that a comparison of public service levels and tax rates with those in nearby jurisdictions can provide voters with a useful instrument to assess politicians' performance. However, we argue that fiscal disparities bias this yardstick, and that this bias may be removed through fiscal equalization. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:4 / 6
页数:3
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