DESCARTES, PASSION, AND THE ABILITY TO DO OTHERWISE

被引:0
作者
Gilbert, Christopher [1 ]
机构
[1] Cuesta Coll, Paso Robles, CA 93446 USA
关键词
FREEDOM; EPISTEMOLOGY; WILL;
D O I
10.5840/jpr20133814
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
What does Descartes regard as necessary for human freedom? I approach this topic from a distinctive angle by focusing on the role of the passions in Descartes's account of free will. My goal is to show that (1) Descartes takes us to have the ability to do otherwise when we judge or choose under the influence of the passions, and that (2) while such ability does not constitute freedom in the fullest Cartesian sense, it does ensure that the judgments and choices we make in response to passions are neither compelled nor unfree, but under our control.
引用
收藏
页码:275 / 298
页数:24
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