Is the Free-Energy Principle a Formal Theory of Semantics? From Variational Density Dynamics to Neural and Phenotypic Representations

被引:54
作者
Ramstead, Maxwell J. D. [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Friston, Karl J. [3 ]
Hipolito, Ines [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] McGill Univ, Dept Psychiat, Div Social & Transcultural Psychiat, Montreal, PQ H3A 1A1, Canada
[2] McGill Univ, Culture Mind & Brain Program, Montreal, PQ H3A 1A1, Canada
[3] UCL, Wellcome Ctr Human Neuroimaging, London WC1N 3AR, England
[4] Univ Wollongong, Fac Arts Social Sci & Humanities, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia
[5] Kings Coll London, Inst Psychiat Psychol & Neurosci IoPPN, London SE5 8AF, England
基金
英国惠康基金;
关键词
variational free-energy principle; active inference; neural representation; representationalism; instrumentalism; deflationary; THERMODYNAMICS; EQUATIONS;
D O I
10.3390/e22080889
中图分类号
O4 [物理学];
学科分类号
0702 ;
摘要
The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to assess whether the construct of neural representations plays an explanatory role under the variational free-energy principle and its corollary process theory, active inference; and (2) if so, to assess which philosophical stance-in relation to the ontological and epistemological status of representations-is most appropriate. We focus on non-realist (deflationary and fictionalist-instrumentalist) approaches. We consider a deflationary account of mental representation, according to which the explanatorily relevant contents of neural representations are mathematical, rather than cognitive, and a fictionalist or instrumentalist account, according to which representations are scientifically useful fictions that serve explanatory (and other) aims. After reviewing the free-energy principle and active inference, we argue that the model of adaptive phenotypes under the free-energy principle can be used to furnish a formal semantics, enabling us to assign semantic content to specific phenotypic states (the internal states of a Markovian system that exists far from equilibrium). We propose a modified fictionalist account-anorganism-centered fictionalism or instrumentalism. We argue that, under the free-energy principle, pursuing even a deflationary account of the content of neural representations licenses the appeal to the kind of semantic content involved in the 'aboutness' or intentionality of cognitive systems; our position is thus coherent with, but rests on distinct assumptions from, the realist position. We argue that the free-energy principle thereby explains the aboutness or intentionality in living systems and hence their capacity to parse their sensory stream using an ontology or set of semantic factors.
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页数:29
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