The Strategic Role of Business Insurance

被引:35
作者
Serpa, Juan Camilo [1 ]
Krishnan, Harish [2 ]
机构
[1] McGill Univ, Desautels Sch Management, Montreal, PQ H3A 1G5, Canada
[2] Univ British Columbia, Sauder Sch Business, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada
关键词
contracts and incentives; risk management; insurance; collaborative relationships; LIMITED-LIABILITY; SUPPLY CHAINS; MORAL HAZARD; CONTRACTS; RISK; PRINCIPAL; QUALITY; AGENT;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2015.2348
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
The use of business insurance has been traditionally studied in a single-firmsetting, but in reality preventing operational accidents involves the (unobservable) efforts of multiple firms. We show that, in a multifirm setting, insurance can be used strategically as a commitment mechanism to prevent excessive free riding by other firms. In the presence of wealth imbalances, contracts alone leave wealth-constrained firms with inefficiently low incentives to exert effort (because of limited liability) and firms with sufficient wealth with excessive incentives. Insurance allows the latter to credibly commit to lower effort, thereby mitigating the incentives of the wealth-constrained firms to free ride. This finding shows that insurance can improve the efficiency of risk management efforts by decreasing free-riding problems.
引用
收藏
页码:384 / 404
页数:21
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