Theory and practice of ITQs in Iceland - Privatization of common fishing rights

In Iceland, fish quotas have been partly transferable since 1984 and freely transferable since 1991, Here, the assumption that an ITQ-regime will lead to an immediate reduction of catch capacity and discourage investment in the fisheries seems questionable, as the ITQ-regime seems to represent an input of ''new'' capital into the fisheries, As a result of quota leasing arrangements, tenancy relations have developed between parts of the coastal fleet and companies with large quota holdings, Crew wages have in these cases dropped, a situation that has provoked two strikes among fishermen, The demand for quotas is influenced by unemployment and lack of alternative sources of income for fishermen, Municipalities are in a number of cases significant participants in the quota market, as there are strong ties between companies and municipalities, A redistribution of wealth and income is taking place as a result of the system. Copyright (C) 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd