The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties

被引:17
作者
Denby, DA [1 ]
机构
[1] Tufts Univ, Dept Philosophy, Medford, MA 02155 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1093/mind/fzl001
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
I propose an analysis of the metaphysically important distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, and, in the process, provide a neglected model for the analysis of recalcitrant distinctions generally. First, I recap some difficulties with Kim's well-known (1982) proposal and its recent descendants. Then I define two independence relations among properties and state a 'quasi-logical' analysis of the distinction in terms of them. Unusually, my proposal is holistic, but I argue that it is in a certain kind of equilibrium and so probably pins down the target distinction uniquely. Finally, I suggest diagnoses of the previous failed attempts to analyse the distinction.
引用
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页码:1 / 17
页数:17
相关论文
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