Discontinuous stable games and efficient Nash equilibria

被引：1

作者：

Scalzo, Vincenzo ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Naples Federico II, Dipartimento Matemat & Stat, I-80126 Naples, Italy

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2012年 / 115卷 / 03期

关键词：

Efficient Nash equilibria; Stability of equilibria; Discontinuous games; EXISTENCE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.089

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In the recent paper by the author [Scalzo, V., 2010. Pareto efficient Nash equilibria in discontinuous games. Economics Letters 107, 364-365], a class of discontinuous games where efficient Nash equilibria exist has been defined. In the present paper, we complete the previous investigation and recognize a class of discontinuous games where the efficient Nash equilibria are stable with respect to perturbations of the characteristics of players. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：387 / 389

页数：3

共 15 条

[11]

Scalzo V, 2008, REAL ANAL EXCH, V34, P239

[12] Pareto efficient Nash equilibria in discontinuous games [J].