The moral supervenience thesis is not a conceptual truth

被引：6
作者：
Harrison, Gerald [1 ]
机构：
[1] Massey Univ, Palmerston North, New Zealand
来源：
ANALYSIS | 2013年 / 73卷 / 01期
关键词：
metaethics; Supervenience; universalizability;
D O I：
10.1093/analys/ans140
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码：62 / 68
页数：7
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