Distributive politics and spatial equity: the allocation of public investment in Chile

被引:36
作者
Livert, Felipe [1 ]
Gainza, Xabier [2 ]
机构
[1] Alberto Hurtado Univ, Econ & Business Fac, Santiago, Chile
[2] Univ Basque Country UPV EHU, Dept Appl Econ 1, Bilbao, Spain
关键词
distributive politics; pork-barrel; political budget cycle; equity-efficiency trade-off; regional governance; Chile; INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT; PORK-BARREL; INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANTS; EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE; MUNICIPAL LEVEL; BUDGET CYCLES; PANEL-DATA; REDISTRIBUTION; DEMOCRACY; ECONOMY;
D O I
10.1080/00343404.2017.1309013
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Distributive politics and spatial equity: the allocation of public investment in Chile. Regional Studies. This paper analyzes the influence of electoral concerns on investment distribution from the central government to Chilean municipalities. Drawing upon panel data, it shows that investment is mediated by pork-barrel and political budget cycles, as well as favouring the relatively better-off areas. Estimations also reveal that resources are channelled to the municipalities where the vote margin in local elections is larger, whereas national results are not relevant, indicating that local governments' lobbying capacity is prioritized over national electoral interests. Based on these results, the implications for regional governance and for reducing the margin of arbitrary allocations are discussed.
引用
收藏
页码:403 / 415
页数:13
相关论文
共 52 条
[1]  
Alesina Alberto., 1989, Economic Policy, V4, P55, DOI 10.2307/1344464
[2]  
Alt J.E., 2006, HDB COMP POLITICS, P845
[3]   Transparency, political polarization, and political budget cycles in OECD countries [J].
Alt, James E. ;
Lassen, David Dreyer .
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 2006, 50 (03) :530-550
[4]  
[Anonymous], 103 CTR GLOB DEV
[5]   Party control of state government and the distribution of public expenditures [J].
Ansolabehere, Stephen ;
Snyder, James M. .
SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2006, 108 (04) :547-569
[6]   SOME TESTS OF SPECIFICATION FOR PANEL DATA - MONTE-CARLO EVIDENCE AND AN APPLICATION TO EMPLOYMENT EQUATIONS [J].
ARELLANO, M ;
BOND, S .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1991, 58 (02) :277-297
[7]   ANOTHER LOOK AT THE INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION OF ERROR-COMPONENTS MODELS [J].
ARELLANO, M ;
BOVER, O .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 1995, 68 (01) :29-51
[8]   Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana [J].
Banful, Afua Branoah .
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, 2011, 96 (02) :380-390
[9]   Government Checking Government: How Performance Measures Expand Distributive Politics [J].
Bertelli, Anthony M. ;
John, Peter .
JOURNAL OF POLITICS, 2010, 72 (02) :545-558
[10]   Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models [J].
Blundell, R ;
Bond, S .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS, 1998, 87 (01) :115-143