The political economy of public employment programs

被引：0
作者：
Fredriksson, P [1 ]
机构：
[1] Uppsala Univ, Dept Econ, SE-75120 Uppsala, Sweden
来源：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 1999年 / 72卷 / 03期
关键词：
political economy; active labor market programs; efficiency;
D O I：
10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00010-9
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
What are the welfare implications of a political equilibrium where the choice of active labor market programs (ALMPs) have to please the employed majority? This issue is examined in an equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. It turns out that the welfare consequences depend on the nature of ALMPs and the political weight attributed to firm interests. If firm values carry little political weight and programs contribute to wage pressure, the employed will opt for excessive program activity. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
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页码：487 / 504
页数：18
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