THE SPONTANEOUS ORDER OF POLITICS

被引：0
作者：
Hebert, David J. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Aquinas Coll, Grand Rapids, MI 49506 USA
来源：
AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS: THE NEXT GENERATION | 2019年 / 23卷
关键词：
Austrian economics; spontaneous order theorizing; use of knowledge; public choice; emergence; entanglement; political economy; PURE THEORY; ECONOMICS;
D O I：
10.1108/S1529-213420180000023010
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Traditional public choice analysis implicitly views political outcomes as the intention of a single-minded person. This view is seriously misguided. Rather than viewing politics as being done by one person or a group of persons acting in concert, this chapter presents an Austrian economist's thoughts on what an Austrian theory of public choice would look like. Particular attention is paid to the emergent, rather than additive, quality that political outcomes exhibit.
引用
收藏
页码：131 / 144
页数：14
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