Leniency policies and illegal transactions

被引:45
作者
Buccirossi, Paolo
Spagnolo, Giancarlo [1 ]
机构
[1] Stockholm Sch Econ, S-11383 Stockholm, Sweden
[2] Consip Res Unit, Rome, Italy
[3] CEPR, London, England
关键词
amnesty; corruption; collusion; financial fraud; governance; hold up; hostages; illegal trade; immunity; law enforcement; leniency; organized crime; self-reporting; whistleblowers;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.09.008
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the consequences of leniency-reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers-on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here we find that-when not properly designed-leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that would not be feasible in its absence. (c) 2005 Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:1281 / 1297
页数:17
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