Microfinance;
Social capital;
Field experiments;
RISK;
INCENTIVES;
INSURANCE;
TRUST;
D O I:
10.1093/restud/rdt016
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
Microfinance clients were randomly assigned to repayment groups that met either weekly or monthly during their first loan cycle, and then graduated to identical meeting frequency for their second loan. Long-run survey data and a follow-up public goods experiment reveal that clients initially assigned to weekly groups interact more often and exhibit a higher willingness to pool risk with group members from their first loan cycle nearly 2 years after the experiment. They were also three times less likely to default on their second loan. Evidence from an additional treatment arm shows that, holding meeting frequency fixed, the pattern is insensitive to repayment frequency during the first loan cycle. Taken together, these findings constitute the first experimental evidence on the economic returns to social interaction, and provide an alternative explanation for the success of the group lending model in reducing default risk.
机构:
Univ Tsukuba, Grad Sch Humanities & Social Sci IPP, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 3058571, JapanUniv Tsukuba, Grad Sch Humanities & Social Sci IPP, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 3058571, Japan
Ofori, Emmanuel
Kashiwagi, Kenichi
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机构:
Univ Tsukuba, Fac Humanities & Social Sci, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 3058571, JapanUniv Tsukuba, Grad Sch Humanities & Social Sci IPP, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 3058571, Japan
机构:
Univ Mississippi, Sch Business Adm, University, MS 38677 USAUniv Mississippi, Sch Business Adm, University, MS 38677 USA
Berns, John P.
Shahriar, Abu Zafar M.
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机构:
Monash Univ, Monash Business Sch, Caulfield, Vic 3145, AustraliaUniv Mississippi, Sch Business Adm, University, MS 38677 USA
Shahriar, Abu Zafar M.
Unda, Luisa A.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Monash Univ, Monash Business Sch, Caulfield, Vic 3145, Australia
Univ Mannheim, Business Sch, D-68161 Mannheim, GermanyUniv Mississippi, Sch Business Adm, University, MS 38677 USA