Electric Boolean Games Redistribution Schemes for Resource-Bounded Agents

In Boolean games, agents uniquely control a set of propositional variables, and aim at achieving a goal formula whose realisation might depend on the choices the other agents make with respect to the variables they control. We consider the case in which assigning a value to propositional variables incurs a cost, and moreover, we assume agents to be restricted in their choice of assignments by an initial endowment: they can only make choices with a lower cost than this endowment. We then consider the possibility that endowments can be redistributed among agents. Different redistributions may lead to Nash equilibrium outcomes with very different properties, and so certain redistributions may be considered more attractive than others. In this context we study centralised redistribution schemes, where a system designer is allowed to redistribute the initial energy endowment among the agents in order to achieve desirable systemic properties. We also show how to extend this basic model to a dynamic variant in which an electric Boolean game takes place over a series of rounds.