Pricing in Queueing Systems M/M/m with Delays

被引：0

作者：

Melnik, Anna V. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] St Petersburg State Univ, Fac Appl Math & Control Proc, Univ Skii Pr 35, St Petersburg 198504, Russia

来源：

CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT, VOL VII | 2014年 / 7卷

关键词：

Duopoly; equilibrium prices; queueing system; EQUILIBRIUM; STABILITY;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

A non-cooperative m-person game which is related to the queueing system M/M/m is considered. There are n competing transport companies which serve the stream of customers with exponential distribution with parameters mu(i), i = 1, 2, ..., m respectively. The stream forms the Poisson process with intensity A. The problem of pricing and determining the optimal intensity for each player in the competition is solved.

引用

页码：214 / 220

页数：7

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