共 50 条
Disguised corruption: Evidence from consumer credit in China
被引:35
|作者:
Agarwal, Sumit
[1
]
Qian, Wenlan
[1
]
Seru, Amit
[2
]
Zhang, Jian
[3
]
机构:
[1] Natl Univ Singapore, NUS Business Sch, 15 Kent Ridge Dr, Singapore 119245, Singapore
[2] Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, 655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[3] Univ Hong Kong, Fac Business & Econ, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词:
Corruption;
Credit cards;
Credit;
Debt;
Household finance;
Government;
Bureaucrats;
Banking;
Political connections;
China;
GOVERNMENT;
FINANCE;
BENEFITS;
FIRMS;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.03.002
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
Using a comprehensive sample of credit card data from a leading Chinese bank, we show that government bureaucrats receive 16% higher credit lines than non-bureaucrats with similar income and demographics, but their accounts experience a significantly higher likelihood of delinquency and debt forgiveness. Regions associated with greater credit provision to bureaucrats open more branches and receive more deposits from the local government. After staggered corruption crackdowns of provincial-level political officials, the new credit cards originated to bureaucrats in exposed regions do not enjoy a credit line premium, and bureaucrats' delinquency and reinstatement rates are similar to those of non-bureaucrats. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:430 / 450
页数:21
相关论文