Social learning and health insurance enrollment: Evidence from China's New Cooperative Medical Scheme

被引:37
作者
Liu, Hong [1 ]
Sun, Qi [2 ]
Zhao, Zhong [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, China Econ & Management Acad, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
[2] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Int Business Adm, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
[3] Renmin Univ China, Sch Labor & Human Resources, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China
[4] Inst Study Lab IZA, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
基金
中国国家自然科学基金; 美国国家卫生研究院;
关键词
Rural China; Health insurance; Social learning; Peer effects; RURAL CHINA; TAKE-UP; RETIREMENT PLAN; MODELS; ESTIMATORS; DEMAND; SYSTEM; CARE; PARTICIPATION; INFORMATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2013.10.012
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines the role of social learning in household enrollment decisions for the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) in rural China by estimating a static game with incomplete information. Using a rich dataset from the China Health and Nutrition Survey. we find that a 10-percentage-point increase in the enrollment rate in a village increases one's take-up probability by 5 percentage points. Using multiple model specifications, we show that the estimated social effects are not driven by simultaneity or common unobserved factors but are consistent with the hypothesis of social learning. We also find that the importance of social effects decreases significantly with households' familiarity with the NCMS as well as with the development of alternative information channels, which further ascertains that the primary mechanism for the social effects is social learning. The evidence suggests that healthier, wealthier, relatively well-educated, older Han male household heads tend to be opinion leaders. (C) 2013 Elsevier BM. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:84 / 102
页数:19
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