Two-sided micro-matching with technical progress

被引:6
作者
Chen, Been-Lon [2 ]
Mo, Jie-Ping [3 ]
Wang, Ping [1 ]
机构
[1] Washington Univ, Dept Econ, St Louis, MO 63130 USA
[2] Acad Sinica, Inst Econ, Taipei 115, Taiwan
[3] Acad Sinica, Inst Informat Sci, Taipei 115, Taiwan
关键词
Micro-matching; Stable assignment; Technical progress; Turnover; COLLEGE ADMISSIONS; STABILITY; GAMES;
D O I
10.1007/s00199-010-0571-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We develop a two-sided micro-matching framework with heterogeneous workers and machines that permits a complete analysis of technical progress commonly used in Neoclassical production theory. Using the concept of "production core," we determine stable task assignments and the corresponding factor-return distributions and then examine how these equilibrium outcomes respond to neutral technical progress pertaining to a particular worker or to all factors. Technical progress that is uniform in all factors will not alter equilibrium micro-matching. Technical progress of the labor-augmenting type may (i) cause a "turnover" by destroying existing stable task assignments and creating new stable task assignments, (ii) generate a richer pattern of wage redistribution than that under labor-improving technical progress in Neoclassical production theory, and (iii) create "spillover" effects from the innovating worker to his/her potential matching machines and his/her directly and indirectly competing workers. The possibility of turnovers and the extent to which factor returns are redistributed depend on the value of the current matches, the extent of outside threats from latent technologies, and the size of technical progress.
引用
收藏
页码:445 / 462
页数:18
相关论文
共 50 条
[31]   Hesitant fuzzy linguistic two-sided matching decision making [J].
Yue, Qi ;
Yu, Bingwen ;
Peng, Yongshan ;
Zhang, Lei ;
Hong, Yu .
FILOMAT, 2018, 32 (05) :1853-1860
[32]   The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market [J].
Kojima, Fuhito .
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2008, 99 (03) :581-584
[33]   Designing a Two-Sided Matching Protocol under Asymmetric Information [J].
Hatanaka, Masanori ;
Matsubara, Shigeo .
PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICE IN MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS, 2009, 5925 :308-321
[34]   Modeling Two-Sided Matching Considering Agents' Psychological Behavior Based on Regret Theory [J].
Wang, Rong ;
Xu, Li ;
Zameer, Hashim ;
Solangi, Yasir Ahmed .
SAGE OPEN, 2020, 10 (02)
[35]   An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems [J].
Kongo, Takumi .
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 2013, 40 (02) :461-478
[36]   Hesitant multi-attribute two-sided matching: A perspective based on prospect theory [J].
Chen, Xi ;
Wang, Juan ;
Liang, Haiming ;
Ha, Jing .
JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENT & FUZZY SYSTEMS, 2019, 36 (06) :6343-6358
[37]   Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems [J].
Yazici, Ayse .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2017, 46 (01) :103-124
[38]   Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents [J].
Fan, Zhi-Ping ;
Li, Ming-Yang ;
Zhang, Xiao .
SOFT COMPUTING, 2018, 22 (21) :7227-7241
[39]   Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems [J].
Ayşe Yazıcı .
International Journal of Game Theory, 2017, 46 :103-124
[40]   Two-sided matching with strict order relations considering threshold values [J].
Yue, Qi .
2014 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT OF E-COMMERCE AND E-GOVERNMENT (ICMECG), 2014, :333-336