Two-sided micro-matching with technical progress

被引:6
作者
Chen, Been-Lon [2 ]
Mo, Jie-Ping [3 ]
Wang, Ping [1 ]
机构
[1] Washington Univ, Dept Econ, St Louis, MO 63130 USA
[2] Acad Sinica, Inst Econ, Taipei 115, Taiwan
[3] Acad Sinica, Inst Informat Sci, Taipei 115, Taiwan
关键词
Micro-matching; Stable assignment; Technical progress; Turnover; COLLEGE ADMISSIONS; STABILITY; GAMES;
D O I
10.1007/s00199-010-0571-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We develop a two-sided micro-matching framework with heterogeneous workers and machines that permits a complete analysis of technical progress commonly used in Neoclassical production theory. Using the concept of "production core," we determine stable task assignments and the corresponding factor-return distributions and then examine how these equilibrium outcomes respond to neutral technical progress pertaining to a particular worker or to all factors. Technical progress that is uniform in all factors will not alter equilibrium micro-matching. Technical progress of the labor-augmenting type may (i) cause a "turnover" by destroying existing stable task assignments and creating new stable task assignments, (ii) generate a richer pattern of wage redistribution than that under labor-improving technical progress in Neoclassical production theory, and (iii) create "spillover" effects from the innovating worker to his/her potential matching machines and his/her directly and indirectly competing workers. The possibility of turnovers and the extent to which factor returns are redistributed depend on the value of the current matches, the extent of outside threats from latent technologies, and the size of technical progress.
引用
收藏
页码:445 / 462
页数:18
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