Brothers in arms - An experiment on the alliance puzzle

被引：30
作者：
Ke, Changxia [1 ]
Konrad, Kai A. [2 ,3 ]
Morath, Florian [2 ]
机构：
[1] Sun Yat Sen Univ, Lingnan Univ Coll, Guangzhou 510275, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[2] Max Planck Inst Tax Law & Publ Finance, Munich, Germany
[3] Social Sci Res Ctr, Berlin, Germany
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2013年 / 77卷 / 01期
关键词：
Alliance; Conflict; Contest; Free-riding; Hold-up problem; In-group solidarity; RENT-SEEKING; INTERGROUP COMPETITION; INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR; SHARING RULES; COMMUNICATION; COORDINATION; EQUILIBRIUM; COOPERATION; CONFLICT; ALTRUISM;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.011
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The generic alliance game considers players in an alliance who fight against an external enemy. After victory, the alliance may break up, and its members may fight against each other over the spoils of the victory. Our experimental analysis of this game shows: In-group solidarity vanishes after the break-up of the alliance. Former 'brothers in arms' fight even more vigorously against each other than strangers do. Furthermore, this vigorous internal fighting is anticipated and reduces the ability of the alliance to mobilize the joint fighting effort, compared to a situation in which victorious alliance members share the spoils of victory equally and peacefully. (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：61 / 76
页数：16
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