Decisions of competing supply chain with altruistic retailer under risk aversion
被引:1
作者:
Liu, Jing
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Hubei Univ Arts & Sci, Hubei Key Lab Power Syst Design & Test Elect Vehi, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R China
Hubei Univ Arts & Sci, Sch Automobile & Traff Engn, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R ChinaHubei Univ Arts & Sci, Hubei Key Lab Power Syst Design & Test Elect Vehi, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R China
Liu, Jing
[1
,2
]
Wu, Yi
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机构:
Hubei Univ Arts & Sci, Sch Automobile & Traff Engn, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R ChinaHubei Univ Arts & Sci, Hubei Key Lab Power Syst Design & Test Elect Vehi, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R China
Wu, Yi
[2
]
Huang, Fuyou
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机构:
Inst Transportat Dev Strategy & Planning Sichuan, Chengdu 610041, Peoples R ChinaHubei Univ Arts & Sci, Hubei Key Lab Power Syst Design & Test Elect Vehi, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R China
Huang, Fuyou
[3
]
Ma, Chao
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Hubei Univ Arts & Sci, Hubei Key Lab Power Syst Design & Test Elect Vehi, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R China
Hubei Univ Arts & Sci, Sch Automobile & Traff Engn, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R ChinaHubei Univ Arts & Sci, Hubei Key Lab Power Syst Design & Test Elect Vehi, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R China
Ma, Chao
[1
,2
]
机构:
[1] Hubei Univ Arts & Sci, Hubei Key Lab Power Syst Design & Test Elect Vehi, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R China
[2] Hubei Univ Arts & Sci, Sch Automobile & Traff Engn, Xiangyang 441053, Peoples R China
[3] Inst Transportat Dev Strategy & Planning Sichuan, Chengdu 610041, Peoples R China
This paper considers the supply chain composed of altruistic retailers and selfish manufacturers under risk aversion. We use the mean variance (MV) method to construct two types of behavior models. One is a two-stage supply chain model with a single manufacturer and a single retailer, and the other is a competitive supply chain model with two retailers and two manufacturers. We discuss the decision-making problems under manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) game and retailer Stackelberg (RS) game, respectively. We analyze the role of risk aversion and power structure. Results show that the more risk aversion manufacturers are, the lower the emission reduction levels are. It also find that the prices increase with power shift from retailers to manufacturers. Finally, we point out that the competing can help the firms earn more benefits via numerical studies.
机构:
Wuhan Univ, Econ & Management Sch, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, Peoples R ChinaWuhan Univ, Econ & Management Sch, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, Peoples R China
Fan, Ruguo
;
Lin, Jinchai
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机构:
Wuhan Univ, Econ & Management Sch, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, Peoples R ChinaWuhan Univ, Econ & Management Sch, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, Peoples R China
Lin, Jinchai
;
Zhu, Kaiwei
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机构:
Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Sci & Dev, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China
Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Beijing 100190, Peoples R ChinaWuhan Univ, Econ & Management Sch, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, Peoples R China
机构:
Wuhan Univ, Econ & Management Sch, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, Peoples R ChinaWuhan Univ, Econ & Management Sch, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, Peoples R China
Fan, Ruguo
;
Lin, Jinchai
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Wuhan Univ, Econ & Management Sch, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, Peoples R ChinaWuhan Univ, Econ & Management Sch, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, Peoples R China
Lin, Jinchai
;
Zhu, Kaiwei
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Sci & Dev, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China
Univ Chinese Acad Sci, Beijing 100190, Peoples R ChinaWuhan Univ, Econ & Management Sch, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, Peoples R China