One-child policy and family firms in China

被引：71

作者：

Cao, Jerry ^{[1
]}

Cumming, Douglas ^{[2
]}

Wang, Xiaoming ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Singapore Management Univ, Singapore 178899, Singapore

[2] York Univ, Econ & Publ Policy, N York, ON M3J 1P3, Canada

[3] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2015年 / 33卷

关键词：

One-child policy; Family firms; Control; Dynastic management; Succession; OWNERSHIP; PERFORMANCE; MANAGEMENT;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.01.005

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Family business plays important roles to fuel economic growth in China. Due to the one-child policy, family firms are increasingly facing human capital constraints for within-family succession. Having only one heir decreases the probability of continuing family management by over 3%, reduces the probability of adult children working in family firms by 14%, and significantly decreases founders' expectations of having young heirs for succession. Having fewer children negatively affects founder's expectation to go public, reduces family firm's reinvestment rate and R&D. Overall, the evidence suggests that the human capital constraints due to the one-child policy impose significant negative impacts on within-family succession. Dynastic management of family firms remains an important challenge for first-generation entrepreneurs in China. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：317 / 329

页数：13

共 23 条

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