Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions

被引：19

作者：

Rachmilevitch, Shiran ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Haifa, Dept Econ, IL-31999 Haifa, Israel

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2013年 / 148卷 / 04期

关键词：

Auctions; Bid rotation; Collusion; Repeated games; ENGLISH AUCTIONS; COLLUSION; INFORMATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1714 / 1725

页数：12

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