Rethinking the "strong programme" in the sociology of knowledge

被引：5
|
作者：
Haddock, A [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Exeter, Ctr Philosophy Social Sci, Exeter EX4 4RJ, Devon, England
来源：
STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE | 2004年 / 35A卷 / 01期
关键词：
strong programme; epistemology; normativity; relativism; finitism;
D O I：
10.1016/j.shpsa.2003.12.011
中图分类号：
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要：
It is widely believed that the "strong programme" in the sociology of knowledge comes into serious conflict with mainstream epistemology. I argue that the programme has two aspects-one modest, and the other less so. The programme's modest aspect-best represented by the "symmetry thesis"-does not contain anything to threaten much of the epistemological mainstream, but does come into conflict with a certain kind of epistemological "externalism". The immodest aspect, however-in the form of "finitism"-pushes the programme towards a radical form of relativism about truth. Accepting these points will allow us to put an end to much unnecessary debate surrounding the strong programme, and allow a more fruitful discussion to begin. (C) 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页码：19 / 40
页数：22
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