Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and Action

This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O'Regan and NoA <<, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939-1031, 2001; NoA << and O'Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; NoA <<, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley's (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3-40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge out of a complex dynamic feedback system at the subpersonal level. Moreover reflection on the role of eye movements in visual perception establishes a further sense in which a distinction between sensorimotor behaviour and cognition cannot be sustained. The sensorimotor theory has recently come under critical fire (see e.g. Block, J Philos CII(5):259-272, 2005; Prinz, Psyche, 12(1):1-19, 2006; Aizawa, J Philos CIV(1), 2007) for mistaking a merely causal contribution of action to perception for a constitutive contribution. We further argue that the sensorimotor theory is particularly vulnerable to this objection in a way that Hurley's active perception theory is not. This presents an additional reason for preferring Hurley's theory as providing a conceptual framework for the enactive programme.