Effects of Individual Physician-Level and Practice-Level Financial Incentives on Hypertension Care A Randomized Trial

被引:93
作者
Petersen, Laura A. [1 ,2 ]
Simpson, Kate [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Pietz, Kenneth [1 ,2 ]
Urech, Tracy H. [1 ,2 ]
Hysong, Sylvia J. [1 ,2 ]
Profit, Jochen [1 ,2 ]
Conrad, Douglas A. [4 ]
Dudley, R. Adams [5 ,6 ]
Woodard, LeChauncy D. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Michael E DeBakey VA Med Ctr, Hlth Policy & Qual Program, Hlth Serv Res & Dev Ctr Excellence, Houston, TX 77030 USA
[2] Baylor Coll Med, Dept Med, Sect Hlth Serv Res, Houston, TX 77030 USA
[3] Southwest Affiliate, Amer Heart Assoc, Houston, TX USA
[4] Univ Washington, Dept Hlth Serv, Seattle, WA 98195 USA
[5] Univ Calif San Francisco, Philip R Lee Inst Hlth Policy Studies, San Francisco, CA 94143 USA
[6] Univ Calif San Francisco, Dept Med, San Francisco, CA USA
来源
JAMA-JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION | 2013年 / 310卷 / 10期
基金
美国国家卫生研究院;
关键词
PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE; IMPROVE QUALITY; HEALTH-CARE; DESIGN;
D O I
10.1001/jama.2013.276303
中图分类号
R5 [内科学];
学科分类号
1002 ; 100201 ;
摘要
IMPORTANCE Pay for performance is intended to align incentives to promote high-quality care, but results have been contradictory. OBJECTIVE To test the effect of explicit financial incentives to reward guideline-recommended hypertension care. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS Cluster randomized trial of 12 Veterans Affairs outpatient clinics with 5 performance periods and a 12-month washout that enrolled 83 primary care physicians and 42 nonphysician personnel (eg, nurses, pharmacists). INTERVENTIONS Physician-level (individual) incentives, practice-level incentives, both, or none. Intervention participants received up to 5 payments every 4 months; all participants could access feedback reports. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES Among a random sample, number of patients achieving guideline-recommended blood pressure thresholds or receiving an appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure, number of patients prescribed guideline-recommended medications, and number who developed hypotension. RESULTS Mean (SD) total payments over the study were $4270 ($459), $2672 ($153), and $1648 ($248) for the combined, individual, and practice-level interventions, respectively. The unadjusted baseline and final percentages and the adjusted absolute change over the study in patients meeting the combined blood pressure/appropriate response measure were 75% to 84% and 8.84%(95% CI, 4.20% to 11.80%) for the individual group, 80% to 85% and 3.70% (95% CI, 0.24% to 7.68%) for the practice-level group, 79% to 88% and 5.54%(95% CI, 1.92% to 9.52%) for the combined group, and 86% to 86% and 0.47%(95% CI, -3.12% to 4.04%) for the control group. The adjusted absolute estimated difference in the change between the proportion of patients with blood pressure control/appropriate response for individual incentive and control groups was 8.36%(95% CI, 2.40% to 13.00%; P=.005). The other incentive groups did not show a significant change compared with controls for this outcome. For medications, the unadjusted baseline and final percentages and the adjusted absolute change were 61% to 73% and 9.07%(95% CI, 4.52% to 13.44%), 56% to 65% and 4.98%(95% CI, 0.64% to 10.08%), 65% to 80% and 7.26%(95% CI, 2.92% to 12.48%), and 63% to 72% and 4.35%(95% CI, -0.28% to 9.28%), respectively. These changes in the use of guideline-recommended medications were not significant in any of the incentive groups compared with controls, nor was the incidence of hypotension. The effect of the incentive was not sustained after a washout. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE Individual financial incentives, but not practice-level or combined incentives, resulted in greater blood pressure control or appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure; none of the incentives resulted in greater use of guideline-recommended medications or increased incidence of hypotension compared with controls. Further research is needed on the factors that contributed to these findings.
引用
收藏
页码:1042 / 1050
页数:9
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