Communication and Cooperation in Markets

被引：4

作者：

Ali, S. Nageeb ^{[1
]}

Miller, David A. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Penn State Univ, State Coll, PA 16801 USA

[2] Univ Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS | 2022年 / 14卷 / 04期

关键词：

REPEATED GAMES; SOCIAL NORMS; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; FOLK THEOREM; REPUTATION; RECIPROCITY; EVOLUTION; TRADE;

D O I：

10.1257/mic.20200296

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Many markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful communication is incen-tive compatible. We find that if each side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives are satisfied only when the volume of trade is low. By contrast, if only one side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives do not constrain the volume of supportable trade. Accordingly, there are strong gains from structuring trade so that one side either moves first or has its cooperation guaranteed by external enforcement. (JEL D82, D83)

引用

页码：200 / 217

页数：18

共 41 条

[11] Rules with Discretion and Local Information [J].