On knowing one's own resistant beliefs

被引：3

作者：

Borgoni, Cristina ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Graz Univ, Dept Philosophy, Graz, Austria

来源：

PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS | 2015年 / 18卷 / 02期

关键词：

resistant beliefs; introspection; self-knowledge; authorship; ownership; MALLEABILITY;

D O I：

10.1080/13869795.2015.1032325

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Influential views on self-knowledge presuppose that we cannot come to know a resistant belief in a first-personal way. Two theses support this supposition: (i) if a belief self-ascription is grounded in the evidence of the person holding the belief, it is third-personal and (ii) we cannot have first-personal knowledge of beliefs we do not control. I object to both of these theses and argue that we can introspect on beliefs of which we lack control even though we cannot assent to their content.

引用

页码：212 / 225

页数：14

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