THE PRICE OF ROUTING UNSPLITTABLE FLOW

被引:38
作者
Awerbuch, Baruch [1 ]
Azar, Yossi [2 ]
Epstein, Amir [3 ]
机构
[1] Johns Hopkins Univ, Dept Comp Sci, Baltimore, MD 21218 USA
[2] Tel Aviv Univ, Sch Comp Sci, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
[3] IBM Res Haifa, IL-31905 Haifa, Israel
关键词
Nash equilibria; selfish routing; price of anarchy; unsplittable flow; congestion games; MULTICOMMODITY NETWORKS; SELFISH USERS; EQUILIBRIA; ANARCHY; GAMES; INEFFICIENCY; COLLUSION;
D O I
10.1137/070702370
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
In this paper we study the "price of anarchy" for the general class of (weighted and unweighted) atomic "congestion games" with the sum of players' costs as the objective function. We show that for linear resource cost functions the price of anarchy is exactly 3+root 5/2 approximate to 2.618 for weighted congestion games and exactly 2.5 for unweighted congestion games. We show that for resource cost functions that are polynomials of degree d the price of anarchy is d(Theta(d)). Our results also hold for mixed strategies. In particular, these results apply to atomic routing games where the traffic demand from a source to a destination must be satisfied by choosing a single path between source and destination.
引用
收藏
页码:160 / 177
页数:18
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