Weighted voting on the IMF Managing Director

被引:2
作者
Mayer, Alexander [1 ]
Napel, Stefan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Bayreuth, Dept Econ, Bayreuth, Germany
关键词
IMF executive board; IMF quota reform; Weighted voting; Voting procedures; Non-binary voting; POWER INDEXES; DECISIVENESS; SUCCESS;
D O I
10.1007/s10101-020-00240-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund elect the Fund's Managing Director from a shortlist of three candidates; financial quotas of IMF members define the respective numbers of votes. The implied a priori distribution of success (preference satisfaction) is compared across different electoral procedures. The USA's Executive Director can expect to come closer to its top preference under plurality rule than for pairwise majority comparisons or plurality with a runoff; opposite applies to everybody else. Differences of US success between voting rules dominate the within-rule differences between most other Directors, and much of the latest reform of quotas.
引用
收藏
页码:237 / 244
页数:8
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