Bilevel Model for Analyzing Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks on Power Systems

被引:182
作者
Li, Zhiyi [1 ]
Shahidehpour, Mohammad [2 ,3 ]
Alabdulwahab, Ahmed [3 ,4 ]
Abusorrah, Abdullah [3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] IIT, Ctr Elect Innovat, Chicago, IL 60616 USA
[2] IIT, Galvin Ctr Elect Innovat, Chicago, IL 60616 USA
[3] King Abdulaziz Univ, Renewable Energy Res Grp, Jeddah 21589, Saudi Arabia
[4] King Abdulaziz Univ, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Jeddah 21589, Saudi Arabia
关键词
Bilevel model; countermeasure strategies; cyber-physical systems; mixed-integer linear programming; topology preserving and load redistribution attacks; LOAD REDISTRIBUTION ATTACKS; ELECTRIC GRID SECURITY; NETWORK INFORMATION; TERRORIST THREAT; COUNTERMEASURES; STRATEGIES; TOPOLOGY;
D O I
10.1109/TSG.2015.2456107
中图分类号
TM [电工技术]; TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0808 ; 0809 ;
摘要
This paper analyzes a coordinated cyber-physical attack on power systems, which could lead to undetectable line outages. Coordinated with physical attacks that cause line outages, the two-step cyberattacks comprising topology preserving and load redistribution attacks could mask and potentially exasperate outages to trigger cascading failures. These coordinated cyber-physical attacks are analyzed in a proposed bilevel model, which aims at identifying the most damaging and undetectable physical attacks constrained by attackers' total budget. After being transformed into a mixed-integer linear programming problem, the proposed bilevel model is solved by a rigorous two-stage solution approach. This paper also discusses the relevant countermeasure strategies. The proposed model, the solution algorithm, and the effectiveness of countermeasures are examined by case studies based on the IEEE 14- and 118-bus test systems.
引用
收藏
页码:2260 / 2272
页数:13
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