Auction in Multi-Path Multi-Hop Routing

被引:14
作者
Su, Xueyuan [1 ]
Chan, Sammy [2 ]
Peng, Gang [2 ]
机构
[1] Yale Univ, Dept Comp Sci, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
[2] City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Elect Engn, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
关键词
Mechanism design; game theory; Nash equilibrium;
D O I
10.1109/LCOMM.2009.082021
中图分类号
TN [电子技术、通信技术];
学科分类号
0809 ;
摘要
We model the multi-path multi-hop routing in networks with selfish nodes as an auction and provide a novel solution from the game-theoretical perspective. We design a mechanism that results in Nash equilibria rather than the traditional strategy proofness, which alleviates the over-payment problem of the widely used VCG mechanism. Through theoretical analysis, the proposed protocol is shown to be effective.
引用
收藏
页码:154 / 156
页数:3
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