Achieving Sustainable Cooperation in Generalized Prisoner's Dilemma with Observation Errors

被引：0

作者：

Shigenaka, Fuuki ^{[1
]}

Yamamoto, Shun ^{[1
]}

Seki, Motohide ^{[1
]}

Sekiguchi, Tadashi ^{[2
]}

Iwasaki, Atsushi ^{[3
]}

Yokoo, Makoto ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Kyushu Univ, Fukuoka, Fukuoka, Japan

[2] Kyoto Univ, Kyoto, Japan

[3] Univ Electrocommun, Chofu, Tokyo, Japan

来源：

AAMAS'16: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS & MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS | 2016年

关键词：

Game theory; Repeated games; Private monitoring; Prisoner's dilemma; Belief-free equilibrium;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

A repeated game is a formal model for analyzing cooperation in long-term relationships. The case where each player observes her opponent's action with some observation errors (imperfect private monitoring) is difficult to analyze, and existing works show that cooperative relations can be sustainable only in ideal situations. We deal with a generic problem that can model both the prisoner's dilemma and the team production problem. We examine a situation with an additional action that is dominated by another action. By adding this seemingly irrelevant action, players can achieve sustainable cooperative relations far beyond the ideal situations. Moreover, for a two-player case, the obtained welfare matches a theoretical upper bound.

引用

页码：1323 / 1324

页数：2