Individual evolutionary learning, other-regarding preferences, and the voluntary contributions mechanism

被引:38
作者
Arifovic, Jasmina [2 ]
Ledyard, John [1 ]
机构
[1] CALTECH, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA
[2] Simon Fraser Univ, Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6, Canada
关键词
Public goods; Voluntary contribution mechanism; Other-regarding preferences; Learning; Conditional cooperation; Reciprocity; PUBLIC-GOODS PROVISION; GROUP-SIZE; SOCIAL PREFERENCES; COOPERATION; RECIPROCITY; FAIRNESS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.05.013
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The data from experiments with the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism suggest five stylized facts, including the restart effect. To date, no theory has explained all of these facts simultaneously. We merge our Individual Evolutionary Learning model with a variation of heterogeneous other-regarding preferences and a distribution of types to provide a new theory that does. In addition, our theory answers some open questions concerning the data on partners-strangers experiments. One interesting feature of the theory is that being a conditional cooperator is not a type but arises endogenously as a behavior. The data generated by our model are quantitatively similar to data from a variety of experiments, and experimenters, and are insensitive to moderate variations in the parameters of the model. That is, we have a robust explanation for most behavior in VCM experiments. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:808 / 823
页数:16
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